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Abstract
The increasing rate of catastrophic events owing to climate change, pandemics, and
significant changes in the international balance of power leading to armed conflicts have
revealed disaster management weaknesses which need to be addressed as soon as possible
so as to ensure the continued stability, safety and indeed existence of mankind. In this
context, the concept of resilience framework has emerged; however, current such artefacts
appear to be rather fragile, ambiguous, and difficult to use in practice in the face of said
vulnerability and complexity. The question is: how can decision-makers ensure that a
proposed resilience framework displays the necessary qualities and contains the required
elements and guidance for the necessary local and cross-domain actions to increase
resilience for their specific sector, organisation, or community? This paper attempts to
define a multi-pronged approach to assess such artefacts in an integrated and holistic way
so that the resilience frameworks are ‘complete’, understood, and actioned and thus
effectively support disaster risk management.
Keywords: Resilience Framework, Disaster Risk Reduction, Defence, Information
System, Architecture Frameworks, Enterprise Architecture

1.

Introduction

A series of significant disruptors such as extreme climate events, pandemics involving new
viruses such as COVID-19 and substantial changes in the international balance of power
underlying present and potential military conflicts have emphasized shortcomings in
dealing with adverse events and the imperative need to address them. Along these lines,
the concept of resilience has been often defined as the capacity to adapt when faced with
adversity, threats, or significant sources of stress. The main idea is to avoid hazards
becoming disasters, i.e. interfering with people and things of value, and the impacts of such
hazards exceeding the ability to avoid, cope or recover from them [1, 2].
Governments and organisations worldwide have considered ways to achieve and
enhance resilience; unfortunately, this endeavour is typically hindered by the inherent
complexity of the components and concepts involved and the lack of appropriate guidance
in using them. The concept of resilience framework has been introduced in order to address
these shortcomings; however, important questions arise: how suitable and ‘complete’ (for
the envisaged purpose) are these frameworks for specific organisations and events? how
should they be actually used at various levels; and, importantly, how can they promote the
essential aspect of collaboration in disaster prevention? What are the desired properties of
such frameworks? This paper proposes a way forward in assessing proposed resilience
frameworks in view of the above questions, adopting a multi-pronged approach with
emphasis on the Informational aspect of the entities involved.

2.
2.1.

Resilience
Definition, Important Aspects and Challenges

Current relevant research proposes a multitude of definitions of resilience, many coming
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from psychology [3]; a mainstream meaning of resilience is similar to that of Janas [4] who
identifies it as the ability to bounce back from adversity, frustration and misfortune. In this
paper, the authors have used a definition relevant to dealing with disaster risk management
in a complex and systemic context. Along these lines, resilience is understood here as the
capacity of a dynamic system to adapt successfully to changes in the environment; in other
words, its agility in the face of adverse changes in its environment. Of course, the various
Information Systems of the involved organisations must support this resilience by
providing the necessary up-to-date information where and when required and importantly,
by being themselves resilient.
Note that in this paper, the authors have chosen to start by focusing the examination of
resilience structuring efforts on a specific geographic location, subsequently extended to a
global context so as to support further research. The chosen initial location is Australia,
owing to its typically high exposure to many types of natural and man-made hazards among
which fire, floods, storms, and tsunamis feature prominently.
Thus, a resilience study performed by an Australian economic think tank [2] identifies
three aspects that contribute to improving resilience: shared awareness, teaming and
collaboration and preparedness, all of which must be supported by the relevant Information
Systems. This highlights the importance of unambiguously representing the available
information and achieving a common shareholder understanding of the current and future
situations, of the relations between entities of interest and of proper and systemic life-long
planning. In addition, an investigative commission in Australia has also found that, in
examining resilience, one needs to look at the contributing factors such as hazards,
exposure and vulnerability [5]; disaster risk can, therefore, be managed by focusing efforts
toward each of these factors. Importantly, in the view of the authors, this endeavour should
be accomplished in all of the ‘before’ (mitigate and prepare), ‘during’ (respond) and
‘after’(recover) phases of disaster management - seen here as an ongoing incremental
effort, containing various resilience emphasis (see Fig. 1).

Mitigate

Recover

Emphasis of
resilience

Prepare

Respond

Fig. 1. Emphasis of Resilience within the (ongoing) Disaster Management Effort

This stance is supported by other research finding that the disaster management phases are
in fact overlapping; for example, effective recovery is planned in advance and is embedded
in the initial disaster response [6]. Thus, one needs to prepare and mitigate the effect of
previous events and disasters, achieve as high degree of resilience as possible, respond
when an event occurs then recover – followed by repeating the loop at a higher level, i.e.
mitigating and preparing in the context of the knowledge gained from the last iteration. In
this context, data and information play a paramount role. Along these lines, Management
Information Systems (MIS) can provide the necessary intelligence as current and historical
operational performance data, while Decision Support Systems (DSS) can assist decision
makers in responding but also preparing for the next possible iteration of the specific
disaster type. Importantly, it is to be noted that while gathering data has become
increasingly easy, the amount of data and its proper interpretation continue to be a
significant problem [7]. This makes the Information System aspect of resilience especially
important and in need of proper modelling.
Another challenge is highlighted by The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and
Recovery report [8] which states that risk assessments need to move from a single point in
the present towards a useful life-long approach that can continuously guide decision
makers towards a resilient future. This supports the life cycle-centred approach proposed
by the authors and further detailed in this paper.
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Various studies have also looked at determinants and technologies that can enhance
resilience (e.g. [3, 9]). One recurring theme was that the inherent complexity dictates a
‘divide and conquer’ approach, by selecting limited sets of aspects at any given time. These
issues are further explored in this paper.
2.2.

Resilience Frameworks

In order to properly structure the complexity of interrelated aspects and interactions making
up the resilience concept there have been calls to create and adhere to resilience
frameworks [10, 11]. Along these lines, the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk
Reduction has overseen the creation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction
2015 – 2030 [12], which aims to decrease disaster risk and losses.
In order to assess potential problems with the current resilience efforts, is important to
review the various meanings given by such efforts to Sendai Framework’s targets and
priorities for action to prevent new- and reduce existing disaster risks. In Australia, the
initial definition of a Resilience Framework describes risk assessment as its primary
function, followed by the call for a framework containing a guide to activities required in
order to reduce the identified disaster risk. The same enquiry, as well as the previously
mentioned think tank [2], have found that vulnerability is in fact created by humans and
owes much to the potentially cascading and compounding character of such events [ibid.],
with the current response being “too little, too late, and too short-sighted” [13].
The above analyses and conclusion reflect the lack of preparedness stemming from
mis-understanding the seriousness of the current situation (be it a shortage of trusted supply
chains, extremely limited domestic manufacturing, or inadequate energy security [14]) and
the complexity of the often compounding and interacting disaster events [15, 16].
The National Disaster Risk Reduction Framework (NDRRF) [17] developed by the
National Resilience Taskforce (NRTF) defines disaster risk as “a product of the effect of
hazard […], impacting on (people and things) and the ability for those people and assets
and systems to survive and adapt” [17].
2.3.

Current Resilience Framework Issues

From the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction report [18] and a the review
of current Resilience Frameworks the issues appear to be as follows:
• there is confusion as to what a resilience framework should actually be composed of;
• there is substantial theoretical background in respect to resilience, however lacking
underlaying metamodels describing concept definitions such as viewpoints, levels of
abstraction, hierarchies, and other important concepts such as life cycle and life history.
• confusion as to what stakeholders are to be involved and how do they relate to each
other;
• inadequate representation of the relation between entities during their entire life;
• No reference to life cycle of the participant entities and no modelling of the human role;
• there seems to be no statement in relation to an explicit set of qualities expected from a
resilience framework (e.g. reliability, maintainability, ease of use, adaptability etc);
• shared situational awareness, understood as a) the perception of environmental
elements and events with respect to time or space, b) making sense of their meaning,
and c) the projection of their future status [19], is not achieved due to issues similar to
the problems encountered in Defence C2 failures [20], such as notably the lack of
interoperability;
• in respect to the previous point, calls to learn lessons from similar, albeit more evolved
Defence high-level requirement descriptions but no detail of how these concepts and
capabilities may integrate into the resilience concept applied to generic disasters.

3.

Proposed Assessment Framework

The authors propose an assessment framework composed of three main components: NonFunctional Requirements (NFR, or system qualities)-based evaluation (as per ISO/IEC
25010 [21], not covered here due to space limitations), Architecture evaluation and EA
Modelling Framework-based evaluation, as shown in Fig. 2. The last step is the most
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comprehensive, allowing to model complex concepts and thus ensuring that the assessment
procedure suitably evaluates the ‘requisite variety’ [22] of the resilience framework in
respect to the complexity of its intended Universe of Discourse (UoD). More precisely, it
evaluates whether the framework is able to guide mitigation, preparedness, response and
recovery efforts matching the content and interactions complexity of real-world disaster
situations.
Ontology / Metamodel
Evaluation factors,
Viewpoints
objectives,
Life Cycle,
methods,
ArchitectureNFRLife History
Assessed
Value analysis Assessed
Self-Evolution / Agility
Resilience
Resilience

List of
necessary
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Fig. 2. The Assessment Framework Concept

3.1.

Architecture Evaluation of the Resilience Frameworks

The variety of viewpoints and apparent lack of underlying guiding paradigm reflected in
the reviewed risk reduction management documents brings in two questions: a) how does
one know that all the appropriate aspects have been covered and b) how can it be ensured
that the represented aspects have been structured in the most suitable way for the intended
purpose? The first question is answered using an Enterprise Architecture Framework
(EAF) (see Section 3.3 for details), while the second question can be dealt with through
the use of architecture evaluation (see Fig. 3).
In regards to the second approach, the authors resort to the use of a generic architecture
evaluation standard, namely ISO42030 [23], which aims to organize and record
architecture evaluations for the enterprise, systems and software fields of application.
According to this standard, the evaluation of alternatives should be performed in two
passes: 1) eliminate proposals that do not satisfy mandatory non-functional requirements
(NFRs), and 2) compare candidate solutions using an appropriate decision-making
method. Concerning the decision-making method specified in the second pass, ISO 42030
also requires that, based on business goals, architecture governance derives the evaluation
objectives, specifying what kind of answers are expected from the architecture evaluation.
Objectives can e.g., include determining if the solution will increase efficiency (and if so,
then to what extent), or if it will improve current capabilities and / or services quality, or if
it will promote new features (e.g., agility).
The comparison of potential solutions is to be performed by defining evaluation factors
that influence the answers, and selecting methods known to deliver these answers. Such
factors may include for example disaster risk mitigation, preparedness, response and
recovery cost, schedule, quality and risk. Appropriate evaluation methods on this level
typically include referring to existing analysis reports, or using expert panels.
Given the high complexity of the Disaster Risk management UoD, it may be sometimes
necessary to establish whether the quality requirements are met, or whether there is a
possible trade-off, or an opportunity to optimize; or the way architectural decisions
contribute to the expected quality attributes (for example, ‘will a federated-type resilience
framework and associated information system improve its agility?’).
If the desired measures are not readily available when inspecting the proposed
architecture, then further architectural analysis may also be needed, requiring the
development of e.g., simulation models usable for sensitivity analyses. It is to be noted
that, as architecture analysis typically also explores alternatives [24], it is quite costly in
resources and time and should only be used when absolutely necessary.
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Fig. 3. Architecture Evaluation of Resilience Frameworks

3.2.

Evaluation Using an Enterprise Architecture Framework

In order to manage complexity, a typical approach for assessing and enacting a Resilience
Framework is to structure its concepts into various categories according to a classification
schema, ideally supported by an underlying metamodel so as to maintain integrity and
consistency of the classifications. Such categories would ideally be viewpoints reflecting
main stakeholder group concerns expressed in the disaster risk reduction requirements.
One such classification structure comes from the domain of Enterprise Architecture,
namely Annex B of ISO15704:2019, called the Generalised Enterprise Architecture and
Methodology (GERAM) [25]. The authors have selected it for being the abstraction- and
thus including the elements of several other mainstream EAFs. GERAM is an established
and proven artefact, having been used in several projects within many domains, including
Disaster Management [26]. The modelling framework (MF) of the Reference Architecture
component of GERAM (called GERA) contains a rich set of viewpoints which can be used
to structure proposed resilience frameworks, in order to assess their completeness for the
envisaged purpose and also to enable a common stakeholder understanding of the present,
future and necessary transition between these two states. This MF is represented in Fig. 4,
together with an example of modelling construct creation by selecting focused
combinations of dimensions.

Views

Generic
Partial
Particular

Instantiation
Identification
Concept
Requirements
Prelim. design

Management
and Control
Product or Service
Software
Hardware

Design
Detailed design
Implementation

Resource
Organisation
Information
Function

Operation
Decommission

LC phases

Machine
Human

Fig. 4. GERA MF and example creation of a modelling construct for dynamic business models
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Assessment of Viewpoints

In regard to the running example of the NDRRF from Section 2.2, one can identify
several viewpoints from the perspective of the GERA MF:
• Understand Disaster Risk (equivalent to Sendai Framework Principle) maps on the
Information Viewpoint of the GERA MF;
• Accountable Decisions (Sendai Framework Principles 1, 2 and 3), comprising
processes and models for action, maps on the Function viewpoint;
• Policies, programs, standards, codes to reduce disaster risk may be represented through
the Partial Model level in the GERA MF;
• Enhanced Investment in disaster reduction maps on Resources viewpoint of GERA
MF;
• Governance, ownership, and responsibility may be mapped on the Organisation
viewpoint of GERA MF (but also in dynamic business models showing relations
between relevant entities, such as further shown in Fig. 5).
Life Cycle, Cooperation, Disaster Compounding and Interaction, Vulnerability

The life cycle context present as an orthogonal dimension in the proposed MF allows to
satisfy the life-long modelling requirement established in Section 2.1. Further on, various
modelling constructs focused on specific viewpoints allow filtering selected aspects in
order to manage the inherent complexity of the UoD. For example, Fig. 5 illustrates how
the modelling construct obtained as shown in Fig. 4 can represent the relations between
entities relevant to disaster management together with the necessary collaboration and
interoperability [27] of the participant entities, in a dynamic business model.
Thus, for example, in Fig. 5 one can see the cooperation of the government (Govt),
various disaster reduction-involved organisations (DRRO) and local communities (Com)
working together to co-design and deliver risk reduction and management programs [6]
(see arrows from these entities to the Disaster Management Project (DMP), Resilience
Framework (RF) and Disaster Response Units (DRU)). Agility of relevant entities (e.g. the
Resilience Framework, Special Disaster Operations SDO, etc.) is represented by arrows
going from the Operation life cycle phase back to their own Architectural, Detailed Design
and Implementation life cycle phases. This signifies that the entities can re-design
themselves to some extent, which is specified in the figure.
Importantly, one can also use this model to analyse proposed future states, such as the
current calls for Defence to create a Special Disaster Operations unit in order to better plan
for- and execute disaster relief operations, for which it is increasingly called upon [28].
In the real world there are many other types of interconnected disasters [29] such as
Earthquake / Tsunami [26], Fire-Clouds–Storm-Lightning–Fire [5]; this kind of interrelation can also be modelled using the above-described approach by selecting appropriate
viewpoints (see e.g. [26] for an example).
The Time Dimension
Time is not represented explicitly in the proposed MF for clarity purposes, although it is
present in the form of a life history concept, which can be represented graphically by adding
an orthogonal time dimension to the modelling constructs derived from the GERA MF.
This has not been represented here due to space limitations.
Other Potential Assessments using the proposed MF
Further detail, important in assisting the current difficulties in the actual implementation
of the Resilience Framework [18], can be provided by using the selected MF. Thus,
Management vs. Service / Mission Accomplishment provides clarity for decision makers
and operators. The Software vs. Hardware division allows to represent the implementation
of required functions and their physical deployment. Automation extent shows e.g. what
information and resources are required by- and what functions must be performed mostly
by machines, so as to avoid putting human disaster response crews at risk. The available
space does not allow giving additional explicit examples of these aspects’ mappings here.
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4.

Conclusions

This paper has adopted a holistic approach towards assessing candidate resilience
frameworks in terms of their completeness and adequacy for their intended use. This may
assist policy makers establish whether a proposed resilience framework is suitable for their
purpose in regard to necessary qualities, suitable structure and applicable viewpoints and
concepts, selected according to their intended domain, resources, etc.
The following key findings have also been made: i) The Disaster Risk Reduction and
Management UoD is a System of Systems, which interact in intricate and often quasichaotic way; and ii) Considering this context, a resilience framework must remain viable
on the long term but also display agility, i.e., be able to to promptly evolve without causing
unacceptable disruption. In other words, a resilience framework must be itself resilient.
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